Tiha kurdska revolucija?

Kurdska zgodba se v luči dogajanja v Iraku, kjer so Kurdi postali odločilna sila v boju proti Islamski državi (IS), preveč poenostavlja. Tudi če se trenutno na severu Iraka vse frakcije skupaj borijo proti IS, to ne pomeni, da so Kurdi enotni. Obstaja namreč močna politična delitev med Kurdsko regionalno vlado z Barzanijem na čelu na severu Iraka in turško-sirsko kurdsko navezo. Barzani je pro-zahodno usmerjen, goji vedno boljše odnose s Turčijo in nabira mednarodno podporo za samostojno kurdsko državo na severu Iraka. Njegova pomoč sirskim Kurdom v vojni v Siriji (kjer so se ti že veliko prej borili ravno in predvsem proti IS) je bila do napada IS na njegovo de facto državo na severu Iraka izjemno omejena in na čase nična, čeprav bi lahko bila, če bi Barzani tako hotel, praktično neomejena. Problem je seveda v tem, da sirski oz. zahodni Kurdistan (imenovan tudi Rojava) obvladuje stranka PYD, povezana s PKK, ki ni samo strankarsko-politični, vojaški, ampak tudi ideološki rival Barzanija in KDP (za več o kurdskih političnih strankah in oboroženih formacijah glej TUKAJ). Dodatni problem predstavljajo tudi dobri odnosi na relaciji Barzani – Turčija. To je izjemno pomembno in v medijih skoraj povsem spregledano dejstvo.

Vir spodnje slike: TUKAJ.

Zastava KCK.

Zastava KCK.

Če navadnim kurdskim vojakom, pešmergam, ni težko priznati odločilne pomoči PYD/PKK, pa gre to zelo težko z jezika vodilnim političnim in vojaškim predstavnikom kurdske vlade na severu Iraka. Nekateri gredo celo tako daleč, da to pomoč povsem relativizirajo. Pred časom je visoki uradnik “obrambnega ministrstva” Kurdske regionalne vlade mirno razlagal, da pripadniki YPG (PYD) in PKK ne pomagajo braniti iraškega Kurdistana pred IS. Če že sodelujejo, ščitijo le sebe, medtem ko se na “pravi” fronti proti IS borijo le pešmerge iz iraškega Kurdistana. Kar je seveda daleč od resnice. Jo pa, izjavo namreč, lahko po eni strani razumemo, saj gre za znotrajkurdski obračun. Ta izjava je namreč sledila izjavi visokega predstavnika PKK, ki je dejal, da pri PKK nikogar niso prosili za dovoljenje za prihod v iraški Kurdistan in bodo tam ostali, dokler bo ta regija potrebovala zaščito (večina borcev PKK, točneje HPG, je tako ali tako že bila na severu Iraka).

Ideološki spopad v Kurdistanu

Ne moremo mimo dogodkov na severu Iraka v zadnjem mesecu, kjer so Barzanijeve pešmerge povsem (namerno?) odpovedale in dobile pomoč prav od PYD (YPG/YPJ) in PKK (HPG/YJA STAR). PYD/PKK sta zaslužni, da jazidska/jezidska skupnost ni trpela še bolj, kot je. Dilar Dirik ugotavlja:

The Yezîdîs in Şengal were supposed to be protected by the peshmerga units (Kurdish fighter units, literally meaning “Those who confront  death”) of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which is the ruling party of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in South Kurdistan (Northern Iraq). However, when IS launched an attack on Şengal, these forces immediately withdrew without fight and without warning, leaving the population at the mercy of IS and, according to witnesses, refused to supply the people with weapons to defend themselves.

Instead, it was the People’s Defense Units (YPG) and the Women’s Defense Units (YPJ), who have been defending Rojava against the Assad regime forces, as well as against jihadists such as IS for the last two years, that crossed the fading Iraqi-Syrian border, in order to defend the Yezîdî people, who were supposed to be protected by the much better equipped KDP. By creating a humanitarian corridor, the YPG/YPJ were able to rescue ten thousands of stranded refugees. Now, they have set up the Newroz Refugee Camp in Derik, Rojava, where countless refugees await further humanitarian aid. Shortly after the YPG/YPJ intervention, the guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) also entered the area from the Qandil mountains to join the fight against IS and protect the people and regions under attack.

Zgoraj opisano dejstvo le redko zasledimo v množičnih medijih. Če pa že, potem se poročila pogosto nanašajo na “kurdske borce” kot rešitelje, kar seveda zamegljuje dogajanje na in okrog gore Sindžar (in ne samo tam!). Zahodne države imajo v Kurdistanu svojega aduta  – Masuda Barzanija. Orožje, ki prihaja, tudi nemško (za več glej TUKAJ), bo šlo v roke prav Barzanijevi liniji (kar pa ne pomeni, da bo tam tudi ostalo – vidimo lahko, v čigavih rokah je pristalo naprimer ameriško orožje). Rojava v Siriji ne dobiva pomoči, PKK pa je še vedno na terorističnih listah.

Kot smo že zapisali v prejšnjih objavah, gre v primeru sirske PYD in turške PKK za močno povezani organizaciji/stranki. Mnogi gledajo na sirsko PYD zgolj kot na podružnico Öcalanove PKK. Podobno velja za PJAK iz iranskega (Iran je še ena od držav, ki s Kurdi igra več iger hkrati, a o tem tukaj ne bomo pisali) ali vzhodnega Kurdistana (imenovanega Rojhelat) in še bi lahko naštevali. Za vse te levo usmerjene formacije velja, da spadajo pod (ideološki) dežnik KCK oz. Skupine skupnosti v Kurdistanu. KCK je (uspešen?) poskus udejanjanja nove Öcalanove doktrine demokratičnega konfederalizma (“kurdskega komunitarizma”) v praksi. Ta se, kot prvi Rafael Taylor, močno navezuje na ideje Murraya Bookchina, utemeljitelja socialne ekologije in libertnarnega komunitarizma (municipalizma). Če lahko verjamemo zapisanemu, je PKK (in vse z njo povezane politične sile) s tem naredila ideološki preobrat. Od marksistično-leninistične, narodno-osvobodilne sile, ki je zahtevala neodvisni (socialistični) Kurdistan, se je prelevila v libertarno socialistično politično formacijo, ki za cilj nima več vzpostavitve neodvisne države, ampak oblikovanje svobodnih (avtonomnih) skupnosti. Ali kot zapiše Rafael Taylor:

At the turn of the century, as the lifelong US radical Murray Bookchin gave up on trying to revitalize the contemporary anarchist movement under his philosophy of social ecology, PKK founder and leader Abdullah Öcalan was arrested in Kenya by Turkish authorities and sentenced to death for treason. In the years that followed, the elderly anarchist gained an unlikely devotee in the hardened militant, whose paramilitary organization — the Kurdistan Workers’ Party — is widely listed as a terrorist organization for waging a violent war of national liberation against Turkey.

In his years in solitary confinement, running the PKK behind bars as his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, Öcalan adopted a form of libertarian socialism so obscure that few anarchists have even heard of it: Bookchin’s libertarian municipalism. Öcalan further modified, rarefied and rebranded Bookchin’s vision as “democratic confederalism,” with the consequence that the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (Koma Civakên Kurdistan or KCK), the PKK’s territorial experiment in a free and directly democratic society, has largely been kept a secret from the vast majority of anarchists, let alone the general public.

Although Öcalan’s conversion was the turning point, a broader renaissance of libertarian leftist and independent literature was sweeping through the mountains and passing hands between the rank-and-file after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. “[They] analysed books and articles by philosophers, feminists, (neo-)anarchists, libertarian communists, communalists, and social ecologists. That is how writers like Murray Bookchin [and others] came into their focus,” Kurdish activist Ercan Ayboga tells us.

Öcalan, an atheist, was finally writing as a free-thinker, unshackled from Marxist-Leninist mythology. He indicated that he was seeking an “alternative to capitalism” and a “replacement for the collapsed model of … ‘really existing socialism’,” when he came across Bookchin. His theory of democratic confederalism developed out of a combination of inspiration from communalist intellectuals, “movements like the Zapatistas”, and other historical factors from the struggle in northern Kurdistan (Turkey). Öcalan proclaimed himself a student of Bookchin, and after a failed email correspondence with the elderly theorist, who was to his regret too sick for an exchange on his deathbed in 2004, the PKK celebrated him as “one of the greatest social scientists of the 20th century” on the occasion of Bookchin’s death two years later.

Nujno je potrebno dopisati, da mnogi v anarhističnih/libertarnih krogih gledajo na “revolucijo” v Kurdistanu z veliko mero skepse. Ne zaupajo “avtoritarni” preteklosti PKK (in s tem PYD), niti sedanji liniji, saj vidijo več nasprotij kot podrobnosti (v teoriji in obliki organizacije) z Bookchinovo teorijo. Da ne omenjamo tega, da so mnogi skeptični tudi do samega Bookchina. A to je že druga zgodba, ki v tem besedilu ni tako zelo pomembna.

Spopad med paradigmama oz. konceptoma KDP in vlade v iraškem Kurdistanu ter tistim od KCK (PKK, PYD  idr.) je neizbežen. Dilar Dirik vidi srž ideološkega spopada v Kurdistanu tako:

The KDP’s concept of liberation is based on economic, capitalist growth, idealized through “independent” oil sales, luxury hotels, and shopping malls, while actively reinforcing the borders drawn in Lausanne by contributing to the oppression of other Kurds. With that in mind, the withdrawal of the peshmergas does not seem to be too surprising either. The peshmergas have been instrumentalized for the independence propaganda, to symbolize the masculinity of the “undefeatable” de-facto state. There is a mystification of peshmerga-ness that associates this identity with Kurdish courage and the freedom struggle. But what once used to be truly “confronting death” against the army of Saddam Hussein has been turned into a regular job tied to a salary. Apart from that, the peshmerga units largely operate along partisan loyalties, leading to the two dominant Kurdish parties, KDP and PUK having their own militias. Hence, it is not surprising that many elderly retired peshmergas listed themselves to fight IS, while the younger generation with no combat experience had fewer motivations, especially since many of them have not been paid regularly, due to the central Iraqi government’s budget cuts to the KRG. The protection of the people, otherwise glorified when its suits the propaganda, is reduced to yet another ordinary part of the apparatus of the state institution.

Ideologically, the tribal-feudal, conservative KDP stands in stark contrast with the leftist-feminist ideology of the Kurdish political movement affiliated with the PKK, the KDP’s traditional rival. The revolution in Rojava is ideologically close to the PKK and the system that is being established there is founded on the PKK’s ideological representative Abdullah Öcalan’s concept of “Democratic Confederalism”. Though the PKK started out with the aim of an independent Kurdish state in the late 70s, it has long transformed its vision and now promotes radical local grass-roots self-governance, gender equality, and ecology, which aims at deeming existing arbitrary borders as meaningless. It rejects the institution of the state as inherently oppressive and hegemonic and discards nationalism as a primitive, backward concept. This move away from statehood as the ultimate manifesto of “independence” has made nationalist sections like the KDP accuse the PKK-affiliated movement of having given up on the “Kurdish dream”.

But is it really true that ideology doesn’t matter in politics, as many claim? No. Even if critical situations often require some pragmatism, in many ways, the events in Şengal illustrate the failure of the nation-state paradigm and the implementation of democratic confederalism in action. In trying to define liberation in terms of capitalist growth, leading to odd pride in oil sales that really only benefit a few multi-millionaire tribes, instead of developing society in a meaningful way, and in trying to assert independence only within the restrictive parameters of the nation-state, which necessitates reliance on some larger power for backup, the KDP has enslaved itself completely and was left absolutely dependent on others. In spite of its macho attempts to declare independence on the backs of other Kurds and other peoples in the region, it failed to protect its citizens and illustrated that the subscription to the dominant order means the opposite of independence.

Zgornji pogled je seveda pristranski (sprašujemo se, ali objektivni pogledi o političnih procesih sploh obstajajo? Menimo, da ne.). Očitno je, kam se Dilar Dirik ideološko umešča. A bistvo zadane. Tudi to, da kurdske enotnosti ni. Je privid, ki ima malo možnosti, da postane resničen. Edino vezivo, ki kurdske frakcije trenutno veže skupaj, je IS. Slednja na eni strani ogroža Barzanijev “kapitalistični raj”, po drugi strani pa tudi levo, ekološko in feministično “revolucijo” v Kurdistanu/ih, ki jo predstavlja KCK in vse z njo povezane organizacije in kolektivi. IS je edini razlog, da je Barzani sploh omehčal svoja stališča do levičarskih skupin v svoji okolici. Seveda je potrebno dopisati tudi, da je PYD naredila vse, da je omejila vpliv Barzanijeve KDP v Rojavi.

Revolucija na terenu

Če smo zgoraj govorili o teoretskih konceptih, s katerimi se lahko strinjamo ali pa ne in o katerih teče živahna debata, je nujno, da pogledamo tudi konkretno delovanje demokratičnega konfederalizma na terenu. Ta se v širšem obsegu udejanja v turških in sirskih predelih Kurdistana. Je nekaj, čemur danes mnogi pravijo revolucija v Kurdistanu/ih.

Dogajanje na terenu je veliko širše in globlje kot je morda videti na prvi pogled. Na spletni strani Libcom.org (okrajšava za libertarni komunizem) lahko beremo detaljno in dogajanju v Rojavi precej naklonjeno poročilo. Avtor Zaher Baher je podrobno opisal razvoj dogodkov v Rojavi od začetka vojne pa vse do današnjih dni. Kot pravi, se je kmalu po umiku sirske vojske s kurdskih območij kreiralo gibanje Tev-Dam, ki je bilo neposredno podprto s strani PYD/PKK:

The Tev-Dam’s programme was very inclusive and covered every single issue in society. Many people from the rank and file and from different backgrounds, including Kurdish, Arab, Muslim, Christian, Assyrian and Yazidis, have been involved. The first task was to establish a variety of groups, committees and communes on the streets in neighborhoods, villages, counties and small and big towns everywhere. The role of these groups was to become involved in all the issues facing society. Groups were set up to look at a number of issues including: women’s, economic, environmental, education and health and care issues, support and solidarity, centers for the family martyrs, trade and business, diplomatic relations with foreign countries and many more. There are even groups established to reconcile disputes among different people or factions to try to avoid these disputes going to court unless these groups are incapable of resolving them.

These groups usually have their own meeting every week to talk about the problems people face where they live. They have their own representative in the main group in the villages or towns called the “House of the People”.

The Tev-Dam, in my opinion, is the most successful organ in that society and could achieve all the tasks they have been set. I believe the reasons for its success are:

  1. The will, determination and power of the people who believe that they can change things.
  2. The majority of people believe in working voluntarily at all levels of service to make the event/experiment successful.
  3. They have set up an army of defence consisting of three different parts: the People’s Defence Units (PDU), the Women’s Defence Units (WDU) and the Asaish (a mixed force of men and women that exists in the towns and all the checkpoints outside the towns to protect civilians from any external threat). In addition to these forces, there is a special unit for women only, to deal with issues of rape and domestic violence.

Kmalu, kot zapiše Zaher Baher, je Tev-Dem prerasel samega sebe in menili so, da potrebujejo nekaj več. Na začetku leta 2014 so tako kreirali Demokratično samovlado (DSA) v vsakem od treh avtonomnih kantonov v Siriji:

After a lot of hard work, discussions and thought, the Tev-Dam has reached the conclusion that they need a DSA in all three Cantons of Kurdistan (Al Jazera, Kobany and Afrin). In the middle of January, 2014, the People’s Assembly elected their own DSA, with autonomy, to implement and execute the decisions from the “House of the People” (the main Tev-Dam committee) and to take over some of the administration work in the local authorities, municipalities, education and health departments, trade and business organizations, defence and judiciary systems etc. The DSA is made up of 22 men and women with each of them having two deputies (one a man and the other a woman). Almost half the representatives are women. It is organized so that people from different backgrounds, nationalities, religions and genders can all participate. This has created a very good atmosphere of peace, brother/sisterhood, satisfaction and freedom.

In a short space of time, this administration has done quite a lot of work and issued a Social Contract, Transport Law, Parties Law and a programme or plan for the Tev-Dam. In the Social Contract, the first page states, “the areas of self-management democracy do not accept the concepts of state nationalism, military or religion or of centralized management and central rule but are open to forms compatible with the traditions of democracy and pluralism, to be open to all social groups and cultural identities and Athenian democracy and national expression through their organization …” There are many decrees in the Social Contract. A few are extremely important for society, including:

  1. A. Separation of state from religion
    B. Banning marriages under the age of 18 years
    C. Women’s and children’s rights must be recognized, protected and implemented
    D. Banning female circumcision
    E. Banning polygamy.
    F. The revolution must take place from the bottom of society and be sustainable
    G. Freedom, equality, equal opportunity and non- discrimination.
    H. Equality between men and women
    I. All languages people speak must be recognized and Arabic, Kurdish and Syrian are the official languages in Al Jazera
    J. To provide a decent life for prisoners and to make prison a place for rehabilitation and reform.
    K. Every human being has the right to seek asylum and refugees may not be returned without his/her consent.

Sardar Saadi se sprašuje, in pri tem pokaže na podobnosti s primeri drugod po svetu, ali je Rojava Chiapas Bližnjega vzhoda. Zapiše:

Despite some political differences between the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in Chiapas and the Kurdish movement led by the PYD in Syria, there are many similarities between these two in terms of their position in both regional and international affairs. The pursuit of creating an autonomous government, the rise of popular assemblies, the emphasis on gender equality and empowering women on every level of social and political life, the anti-imperialist and anti-authoritarian ideology, the stress on ecological preservation and respect for all living creatures, self-defense, and many other aspects indicate how the Rojava revolution resembles the resistance of the Zapatistas in Southern Mexico.

Kako zelo podobna je situacija ali kako vzdržna je primerjava s Chiapasom, na tem mestu (še) ne moremo odgovoriti. Vsekakor pa je dogajanje v Rojavi nekaj, kar od nas zahteva vso pozornost. Enako seveda velja za turški Kurdistan, od koder pravzaprav vse izvira in s katerim je dogajanje v Rojavi neločljivo povezano.

Zgornja zgodba izstopa iz celotnega dogajanja na Bližnjem vzhodu, o tem ni nobenega dvoma. Prav gotovo gre za enega od bolj progresivnih procesov, ki so stranska posledica potresa  (ali t.i. arabske pomladi), ki je zamajal in dokončno porušil stara razmerja moči na Bližnjem vzhodu in v severni Afriki. Izbruhnile so silovite vojne (krivda Zahoda za te je večja kot jo priznavamo) in nemiri, iz pepela katerih vstajajo številne prikazni. Da se na severu Sirije trenutno najbolj silovito spopadata IS in YPG ni nobeno presenečenje. Dva svetova, dve viziji. Ne pozabimo, da je IS imela, do dogodkov v Iraku, ki so ogrozili interese Zahoda, vsaj skrito podporo nekaterih držav ali vplivnih posameznikov iz držav, ki so zaveznice Zahoda. Vsa podpora pa tudi danes zagotovo ni usahnila. Da je Zahod s svojo intervencionistično politiko vsaj posredno kriv za nastanek IS, pa je že oguljeno dejstvo.

Za konec

Ko govorimo o Kurdistanu, ne moremo mimo Turčije. O njej do sedaj nismo veliko govorili. Turčija ima v sirsko-iraško-kurdski zgodbi več obrazov. Igra s skritimi kartami in precej tvega. Prvič, nedvomno je, da Turčija velja za tranzitno državo za borce sirske opozicije, tudi za tiste iz najbolj radikalnih islamističnih skupin. Drugič, je tranzitna država za orožje za omenjene skupine. Tretjič, obstajajo številna pričevanja in slike, ki potrjujejo, da se v turških bolnicah zdravijo ranjeni borci številnih anti-režimskih (sunitskih) oboroženih skupin iz Sirije, tudi tisti iz najbolj radikalnih. Četrtič, sama je ujeta v kompleksen odnos z opozicijskimi silami v Siriji. Petič, čeprav je s PKK v mirovnih pogajanjih, je izredno nervozna zaradi dogajanja v Rojavi, saj ve, da je le-ta tesno povezana s Kurdi v Turčiji. Šestič, Turčija v kurdski zgodbi podpira Barzanija, s katerim je v boju proti PKK (Turčija razume ramerje med PKK in PYD tako: PKK=PYD) flirtala že v preteklosti.

Zaradi vsega naštetega zato ne presenečajo, če so poročanja točna, zahteve Turčije do KDP, da še naprej ne pošilja nikakršne pomoči Kurdom v Siriji. Kar naj bi že povzročilo velike napetosti med kurdskima rivaloma na severu Iraka, strankama KDP in PUK (ti dve sta v devetdesetih letih že bili medsebojno vojno, danes pa skupaj obvladujeta iraški ali južni Kurdistan). Pred Kurdistanom (mislimo na celotni Kurdistan) so kompleksni časi. Ne samo zaradi “zunanjih” sovražnikov, ampak tudi zaradi notranjih trenj. Zdi se, da je ljudstvo vse bolj naklonjeno “revoluciji”, Zahod in regionalni igralci pa stavijo na Barzanija. Je zatorej scenarij že napisan? Tiha kurdska revolucija, ki to za ene je, za druge pa ne, bo morda kmalu prišla v ospredje zanimanja svetovne javnosti.

 

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5 komentarjev on “Tiha kurdska revolucija?”

  1. […] Tiha kurdska revolucija? → […]

  2. […] Zgornja infografika prikazuje pisano druščino kurdskih političnih/vojaških organizacij in njihovih zavezniških asirskih in jezidskih skupin v Siriji (zahodni Kurdistan), Iraku (južni Kurdistan), Iranu (vzhodni Kurdistan) in Turčiji (severni Kurdistan). Kot lahko vidimo, so levo opredeljene skupine – PKK v Turčiji, PYD v Siriji, PJAK v Iranu in PCDK v Iraku – povezane preko KCK. V eni od preteklih objav smo zapisali*: […]

  3. […] Več o kurdskih političnih/vojaških formacijah preberite TUKAJ, o kurdski revoluciji pa TUKAJ. […]

  4. […] in je v interesu predvsem Turčije). Prav tako jo skrbi (trenutno vladajočo garnituro namreč) družbenopolitični eksperiment v Rojavi, ki namesto neodvisne države zahteva radikalno avtonomijo. Eksperiment, ki torej ne zahteva […]

  5. […] Tiha kurdska revolucija?  […]


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